NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
TOKYO REGIONAL OFFICE

January 11, 2002

The National Science Foundation's Tokyo Regional Office periodically reports on developments in Japan that are related to the Foundation's mission. It also provides occasional reports on developments in other East Asian countries.

Tokyo Office Report Memoranda are intended to provide information for the use of NSF program officers and policy makers; they are not statements of NSF policy.

There follows an edited version of a report by Craig E. Dorman, who until March 2001 was Chief Scientist at the Office of Naval Research (ONR).  Dr. Dorman was in Japan from July 18 through August 4, 2001, on the first leg of a more extensive East Asia-Pacific tour whose overall objective was to assess ONR’s posture regarding international science and technology throughout the Asia-Pacific Region.  His observations and comments should be of interest to others in addition to ONR and its constituents.  The National Science Foundation’s Tokyo Regional Office is grateful to Dr. Dorman for granting permission to reproduce this excerpt as an East Asia Report Memorandum.

A:  Overview: Recent and Pending Changes in the Japanese Science and Technology System

This is a period of dramatic change for Japanese science and technology (S&T).  In 1995, the Diet passed the Science and Technology Basic Law which, among other things required two successive five year plans.  This law also undertook to double the Japanese Government’s research and development (R&D) budget over its 1992 level by the end of Japan Fiscal Year 2000 (March 31, 2001).  Under the first Science and Technology Basic Plan (Japan Fiscal Years 1996-2000), the budgetary target was met which required a total R&D outlay of 17 trillion yen (approximately $140 billion) over that five year period.  A number of reforms intended to increase Japanese contributions to basic research were also implemented under this plan.  The second Science and Technology Basic Plan (Japan Fiscal Years 2001-2005) went into effect on April 1, 2001 (the beginning of Japan Fiscal Year 2001) with planned spending levels of 24 trillion yen (approximately $ 200 billion) over the next five years, albeit tied to the economy, plus additional reforms.  These are accompanied by major structural changes in the S&T management and execution structure, some of which took effect at the start of calendar year 2001, and others that will take place over the next few years[1]. 

In brief, some of the more significant changes (details are available at the IFO – we were given brochures that spell out many of them)

-     On January 1, 2001, the Council for Science and Technology Policy (CSTP) became one of four committees within the Cabinet Office as of 1 January, advisory to the Prime Minister (no such organization or coordinating mechanism existed before)[2].  It has recently issued a plan to give priority in S&T to Life Sciences, Information and Communications, Environment, and Nanotechnology and Materials (with four other areas “crucial to national security”: energy, manufacturing technology, social infrastructure and ‘Frontier Areas”) in the allocation of 2002 budgets (which process is now underway).  The Council is also conducting a review of all aspects of S&T policy.

-     The former Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture (Monbusho) and Science and Technology Agency (ST, have been combined into a single Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (Monbukagakusho, or MEXT).

-  Government Laboratories (e.g., the MITI’s AIST of Agency for Industrial Science and Technology laboratories), have become “independent administrative organizations” (e.g., AIST is now the National Institute for Advanced Industrial S&T), principally funded by but independent of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI, formerly MITI), with both major reorganizations and the ability to determine how to allocate its own funds

-     METI is encouraging technology transfer via the establishment of small companies and collaboration of academics with industry (before 1997 this was not allowed).  In a sense, S&T support is now viewed as “infrastructural” spending (like transportation and construction, both of which have been fueled by the government), albeit there is considerable debate about how to evaluate its impact.

-     As of this writing (August 2001), public Corporations, such as JAMSTEC (Japan Marine Science and Technology Center) and NASDA (National Space Development Agency) which are funded by government agencies but whose employees are not civil servants, have not yet been structurally changed, but obviously will be influenced by the Council’s priorities, and are under review.

-    In 2003, National universities will (most likely) become independent (professors and technicians will no longer be government employees [although flat-level salaries are guaranteed for five years] and the universities will be able to decide on their own, without MEXT’s approval, to start or stop programs), albeit the number of students and tuition levels will remain under Ministry control.

While most of these major changes are so new that it is too early to assess their long term impact, they are naturally causing considerable discussion and debate.  In general, they are aimed at reducing redundancy, enhancing cooperation among the various sectors of S&T (e.g., universities and agencies or research institutes, which have historically operated with near zero interface), providing more coherence and strategic direction across the very large and capable Japanese S&T enterprise, and encouraging and exploiting indigenous innovation in research, in much the same way that Japan successfully exploited (in what some called a ‘free ride’) western science before and during the ‘bubble’ years.  Perhaps as importantly, these changes in S&T policy and structure are not isolated, but rather are just part of a number of major reforms that increase the power of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet and the accountability of politicians, while reducing the power of the bureaucracy.

On top of all this, of course, is the ‘recession’ and significant anticipated economic reform and associated ‘pain’.  Major S&T endeavors that are not near completion may well be jeopardized, and it is unlikely that any new initiatives outside the priority areas (and probably few major new ones within) will be supported.  Thus in spite of the proposed overall increase in S&T funding (again, tied to GDP and GDP growth), I believe that financial retrenchment in areas such as facilities and major instrumentation can be expected, in contrast to the large outlays of  ‘supplemental’ support which have fueled many of the major infrastructure programs over the last several years (e.g., at JAMSTEC, the ‘supplemental’ budget in 98-00 was 653M Yen, compared to a Base budget [including salaries] of 910M Yen; this went largely into new buildings and equipment, including the Earth Simulator).  And, of course, the details of Prime Minister Koziumi’s economic reform plans have not yet been seen, and the degree of pain the Japanese public is willing to tolerate (especially in areas like construction) is unknown.

Further, while most interest and attention is focused on the badly needed economic reforms, there is also discussion about changes in roles and relationships of the Japanese Self  Defense Forces.  While Constitutional (and SOFA) changes seem unlikely, there are a number of lesser actions, based on constitutional interpretation or policy decisions; and some of these will almost surely occur within the next few years.  Of particular interest for DOD-related RDT&E, much of the debate centers around the issue of “collective” vs. “minimum” self defense.  Basically, the JSDF now partners with, and will transfer of military technologies to, only the US; and will not export arms (i.e., anything that goes into a weapon system or military equipment), even to us.  Thus technology that results from US-Japan defense cooperation cannot be passed on to other US allies.  And even more importantly, these restrictions combined with the overall Japanese ‘isolation’ of the Self Defense forces severely limit not only US DOD but also Japanese access to Japanese commercial and academic technology.  Fundamentally at issue is the role of ‘military’ forces in the 21st century, as Japan seeks greater international status.

While many of the reforms described above may not seem earthshaking to those not familiar with past Japanese S&T Ministries and their practices, to those of us who are, they are indeed dramatic both in scope and in style, and will in all likelihood (as intended) change the fundamental structure of S&T in universities, government and quasi-government organizations, and industry.  As just a couple examples: the Japanese historically have been loath to set priorities without extended discussion leading to consensus, since picking winners means making losers.  The new system is firmly based upon top-down mandated prioritization, both overall and within agencies. It also significantly increases the amount and nature of competition, while enhancing mobility by both positive incentives and removing many employment safeguards.  Further, in the past, Ministries were unable to fund work outside their own agencies and institutes, and their  employees (including professors at national universities) were likewise unable to access resources from any but their own ministries and agencies.  Thus interaction and information or infrastructure sharing was essentially blocked; e.g., scientists at university of Tokyo’s Ocean Research Institute (under Monbusho) couldn’t do science from JAMSTEC’s ships (under STA).  These barriers are now broken down, and while it will take time to change old habits, at least logical collaborations are no longer ab initio precluded. Similarly, industry-researcher collaborations are now encouraged and rewarded, while before the new reforms, most such interactions were prohibited.

As noted above, the reforms are just now kicking in; and I have given only a very cursory description of them (the IFO has details), and focused just on those related to S&T.  The S&T ones are however crucial, since Japan’s economy in the recent past and in the future has rested and will rest heavily upon their technological capabilities, and they fully recognize that drastic change will be necessary if they are to retain their status as a dominant economic power. Indeed, I believe that the changes they are trying to implement are crucial to the future of the nation.  At issue, therefore, are how well they can carry through on their intent of stimulating and exploiting their intellectual and innovative capacity, and whether they have made the right choices in the priorities they have selected.  They seem, for example, to be banking heavily upon information technology (IT).  But IT is a highly competitive field globally, and market size for many of the envisioned future capabilities depends upon progress (and life style choices) in the world’s developing nations; not the least of which is China, and China is moving very fast in the same technological direction, with many competitive advantages.  And, from the standpoint of reform implementation, it is open to debate whether the Japanese have done enough to eliminate past legal and regulatory barriers to collaboration and innovation, and whether they can now take advantage of some of the new opportunities.  I give a few additional examples of residual concerns below.

In addition to reform of its own systems, Japan also faces challenges in its S&T relations with other nations. It has many bilateral relationships, at many levels (Ministries, agencies, institutes, individuals).  It has, however, very few multilateral ones, albeit there are signs of movement in that direction.  And, it has yet to play the leadership role of which it is capable, in areas where Japan has technological capacities above those of its Asian neighbors.  JAMSTEC’s underutilized ships and deep sea research systems are one example; another was provided at NASDA, where a recent international review panel suggested that Japan should take a leadership role in earth observations, rather than spreading its resources across too many areas.

In industry, although increased unemployment in the near term will be an inevitable result of economic reforms, in the longer term Japan faces likely manpower shortages, especially in high technology.  There is naturally much concern with competition from China, as well as several SE Asian countries, many of whom are targeting the same sorts of high tech manufacturing that drove Japan’s economic success.  Relationships with China and Korea are particularly problematic in my opinion, and though the issues are multidimensional, one need only contrast the remaining differences in historical perceptions (the textbook issue) with the dominance of Chinese and Koreans in the list of international students and researchers at virtually every civilian organization we visited (see below).

In summary, it is indeed a very ‘interesting’ period for S&T in Japan, and the outcome of the policy changes and government reforms over the next few years will have a very long lasting impact both on the nation’s strength and security, and on all aspects of its relationships with the US and its Asian neighbors.  It will be very important for us to follow the changes closely, to enhance our long term mutual cooperation and support the moves to multilateralism and openness.  Of particular importance in my opinion, Japan has invested very heavily in S&T infrastructure – examples mentioned above and below include the test ship AKUSA, JAMSTEC’s ships and vehicles, and the Frontier program’s Earth Simulator. Both sides could profit from greater scientific access to these facilities, and the US could play an important role in helping Japan eliminate the barriers to internal collaboration between different S&T sectors and institutions, while ourselves benefiting greatly from effective use of the available and, again in my opinion, underutilized infrastructure.

B:  Japan Visits:  Following are a few brief notes on some of my visits; I was accompanied on all visits by Commander Pennypacker, Dr Narita, or another member of the ONR Asia Office staff in Tokyo.

MEXT:  The new Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) combines the previous Monbusho and STA.  MEXT was created as part of the reform that reduced the overall number of Ministries and strengthened the power of the PM and Cabinet, in the case of S&T largely through the establishment of the 14-member Cabinet level Council for Science and Technology Policy (one of just four such committees), which has its own staff and, as its name states, sets the policy for MEXT and the other ministries that support S&T (MEXT has about 63 percent of the S&T budget, METI about 15 percent).  Accompanying these structural changes is the new S&T Basic Plan, which is both more strategic (it includes priorities, one of which is promotion of basic research, at the insistence of the old Monbusho; plus reforms to increase competition, mobility, and quality) and more comprehensive (including a social component) as well as increasing the five-year budget to 24 trillion yen (or 1 percent of GDP, assuming a 3.5 percent/year GDP growth.  We were told that MEXT emphasizes the 24 trillion yen, while the Ministry of Finance emphasizes the condition that expenditures be 1 percent of GDP). 

              Structurally, MEXT has three Education Bureaus, and three S&T/R&D Bureaus.  Interestingly, the Education and S&T sectors are housed in separate buildings, at least for the time being; and, inevitably, there will continue to be arm-wrestling between them.  However it is notable that we were briefed by ex-Monbusho folks who are now responsible for S&T policy and international affairs.  At issue therefore is whether MEXT will indeed be able to break down the old M/S barriers, or whether the new overlay will merely be a shell containing the two residual sets of  bureaucrats.  The former seems much more likely (indeed almost assured) given the direction in which the country is moving, so it is more an issue of timing and thoroughness of integration, rather than whether it will indeed happen.

              Another interesting part of our discussion centered upon the universities and research institutions under MEXT.  We were told, for example, that the committee dealing with the transformation of national universities into independent institutions has indicated that it will reach a conclusion by the end of 2003; but MEXT has already announced its intention to implement this transformation.  Previous National Research Institutions have already become Independent Administrative Institutions, and while there has yet been no change to the “Public Corporations”, there is considerable discussion about the status of the three separate space agencies, and even some about integrating JAMSTEC with ORI or the National Institute of Polar Research.  The bottom line is: expect yet more changes, focused on quality, mobility, and integration.

              Interestingly, at the end of our briefing at MEXT, I was asked for my views on the most significant weaknesses in the Japanese science system.  I gave three.  The first is the separation between engineering (old STA) and science (old Monbusho) – one example being the inability of university scientists to work on JAMSTEC ships.  This has truly crippled progress, not to mention requiring redundant investments.  At least in experimental sciences, the two have to go hand in hand; and the fundamental, if not cultural, barriers to fixing this seem to be in progress.  The second is the hierarchical system in the universities: each “lab” has one professor, one associate professor, one or more assistants or instructors.  And, the professor calls all the shots on what gets studied, and gets his name on all the publications.  Thus we see less than desirable stimulation of the intellectual drive of new scientists, lack of mobility, barriers between labs, little intellectual interchange between very narrow specialties let alone disciplines, etc., etc; and I don’t see any of the reforms, yet, touching this debilitating situation.  The third major weakness is the isolation of national-security driven S&T.  This problem will be hard for Japan to deal with given its WWII-dominated historical focus, but modern military missions including responsibilities such as disaster management and peace operations, plus the inherent similarities between ‘security’ and ‘civil’ technologies, to me at least imply that change will be essential.  And, in my opinion it will be at least as important for MEXT and other Ministries to understand and support such needed change, as it will be for the JSDF to argue for a more legitimatized role in Japanese society.

JSPS: The Japan Society for the Promotion of Science is a ‘quasi-governmental’ organization (all funds from MEXT, though independent), and essentially functions like NSF.  It was founded in 1932, and underwent a major change in 1999 under the First Science and Technology Basic Plan with the infusion of 82 billion yen from Monbusho, partly in anticipation of the changes which led to MEXT.  Basically, JSPS manages competitive grants to individual university scientists, in a bottom-up, peer-review, proposal-pressure based funding allocation manner, while MEXT is responsible for the “big” and “targeted” or strategic programs.  There is apparently great demand for JSPS support, since we were told that success rate is about 16 percent.  In addition to its competitive programs for Japanese university scientists (Grants in Aid, and Research for the Future which is intended to stimulate university collaboration with and formation of venture SMEs), JSPS manages fellowships for young researchers and international scientific exchange.  Its long list of exchanges is dominated by China and Korea, each of which have about three times the activity of the United States (US exchanges are somewhat less than those with Thailand!). Of  particular interest to me was the availability of short term individual fellowships (7 to 90 days for American researchers; NSF is the implementing agency for all US exchanges[3]) which can be very effectively used for planning.

              Although almost all of JSPS’s international programs (exchanges and seminars) are bilateral, there are two small multi-lateral programs with ASEAN nations, in biotechnology and (notably) coastal oceanography (funded by overseas development funds and thus limited – but, we were told, additional participation at own expense may be able to be discussed).  And last year (July 2001), for the first time, with the assistance of NSF, JSPS ran an Advanced Studies Institute-as a 10-day multinational seminar on robotics involving senior scientists and post-docs from Australia, China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the United States.

AIST:  Under the new system, MITI’s internal Agency for Industrial Science and Technology has become the METI-funded autonomous (i.e., gets targets and most of its funds from METI but itself determines how to meet the targets) National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (thus retaining its acronym).  Of all the organizations we talked to, this one has had the most radical reform.  AIST can now get funds from private sources (we were told its goal is 30 percent from industry), get and transfer IPR (but not for equity interest), and assign, fire and hire its own staff (it has both tenured and limited term ‘Permanent’ Researchers, with the latter category growing; plus a comparable number – about 2500 – Visiting Researchers from universities and industry). Fifteen previous Research Institutes have now been merged into one. In turn, AIST has totally reorganized its research units. It now has 23 Research Centers, each of which has a short-term (3-7 years) mission oriented goal and top-down management, with an average of 10-20 AIST researchers and about the same number of visitors; 22 Research Institutions which are long-term basic and applied research oriented with bottom-up management (50-100 AIST and a similar number of visitors); seven Research Initiatives that respond to government needs and are incubators for new centers and the Institutes; and two Special Divisions.

              The research units compete within AIST, and are reviewed periodically. Although overall AIST government funding is secured until (but just until) 2005, it is firmly expected that some units will succeed and others fail.  While a few of them must carry on national functions of the previous separate institutes (e.g., geological survey and metrology), most are directly focused on the priorities set out by the Council on Science and Technology Policy, and must demonstrate that they make a difference.  We were shown a matrix that demonstrates the alignment.  Two other points of note: AIST’s President, Hiroyuki Yoshikawa, is also President of JSPS, President of the Science Council of Japan, heads the new Science City, and is a “Head of Administrations Concerned” member of CSTP, appointed by the PM  (and he likely has several other positions; to me, this is a hangover of the ‘old’ system; no way can any one human reasonably be expected to effectively administer so many diverse groups, nor should he given their inherent conflicts.  I don’t know the man, but no matter how good he is, I have my doubts about the rationality of placing such a broad operational and organizational mandate under a single bureaucrat).  And, like in JSPS, the roster of international visiting researchers is dominated by Chinese and Koreans, with the US coming in slightly behind Thailand!  AIST will be very interesting to watch: many of its research units are pursuing S&T of significant interest to us, it has good and growing links to Japanese industry, and it is a most interesting experiment in radical reform that could hold many lessons for the universities and agencies of MEXT.

Toshiba:  We visited the Toshiba Science Institute, along with several hundred school children.  Super show, very impressive both from the standpoint of what they’re doing in S&T (especially in IT with a focus on wireless networks, systems and services; and in the number of manufacturing and sales offices in China and SE Asia), and as an example of a typical major Japanese corporation’s efforts to ‘promote’ their S&T through an “Institute”, which is really an interactive science museum – established in 1961, and about 120K visitors per year.  This Institute is well worth a visit both for the professionalism of Toshiba’s PR/outreach, and for the insight into Toshiba’s overall business and attitude to the public.  However, we did not visit their corporate research lab, which was next door.  Nor did the video we were shown about R&D have much to add to the basic video about the company.  As with other Japanese corporations, that dominate their national S&T investment, there is undoubtedly much that is of great interest to us, yet remains ‘inscrutable’.  At issue is how to access it, in particular given the isolation of the self defense forces and the prohibitions about arms exports.

JAMSTEC and YES:  JAMSTEC, like NASDA, is a Public Corporation under MEXT (previously under STA).  JAMSTEC is in general well known to US investigators, so I will make only a few brief comments.  First, Japan’s investment in ocean research infrastructure through JAMSTEC has been extensive and of long duration.  JAMSTEC has excellent engineers who have developed many innovative seagoing systems, plus access to exceptional industrial technology.  Changes since my last visit (in the early 90’s) have included a beautiful new headquarters building, the Deep Sea Microorganism System which has perhaps the world’s best capability for maintaining and studying marine extremophiles, several new AUVs and ROVs, two new ships (KAIREI with the 11,000M ROV KAIKO, and MIRAI), a number of offshore observatories, and the new Mutsu Institute for Oceanography.  Soon to come are the new deep sea drilling ship CHIKYU,  and the Yokohama Institute for Earth Science (YES) with its quite astounding Earth Simulator (40TFLOPS throughput vector-parallel computer – the first nodes were being installed when we visited).  The investment in marine science infrastructure, using both base and supplementary budgets, has been absolutely astounding, particularly when you consider that JAMSTEC has only 244 regular employees.  These resources beg for exploitation.  I will comment on this in section C.

NASDA:  We received a very thorough and open briefing on NASDA’s status and the impact of recent changes.  NASDA is at the moment a ‘besieged’ agency (basically, although the public is not negative toward space, there is likewise no strong support) given the failure of its last two rocket launches (much as NASA was after many of our own difficulties); and it is very focused on succeeding in its upcoming third attempt.  Beyond that, it is dealing with two major issues.  The first is response to the recommendations of an international review panel that was called in 1998 by its former President, Isao Uchida, and which just this March reviewed progress.   Basically, according to this panel, NASDA has been trying to do too much with limited resources, and has to prioritize; and as part of this, it should take an international leadership role in some area of expertise, e.g. earth sensing, with a focus on Asia.  This would, besides providing a manageable space target, couple well to Japan’s other ocean capabilities, and address the CSTP priority areas of environment and Frontier topics. But to repeat, prioritization is new, and hard, in Japanese S&T.     The second issue for NASDA is the overall Japanese structure for space development.  The previous Space Activities Commission, which provided guidance for all space activities, has now been relegated to MEXT;  it has been superceded by CSTP, which however has yet to take a firm hand in this arena.  And, there are three major space agencies – NASDA which is a Public Corporation that gets support from MEXT and two other Ministries (transport and telecommunications), and the National Aerospace Lab and Institute of Space and Astronautical Science, both of which are under MEXT.  And, although it is not at the moment a topic of discussion, space activities no matter how peaceful in intent have inherent implications for national security, and sooner or later this will have to be resolved.  As our briefer said, the Japanese space program, and NADSA in particular, is ‘under construction’.

TRDI, JDA: In addition to receiving an in-depth briefing by the US Chief of MDAO, we visited the Japanese Defense Agency’s Technical Research and Development Institute, and it’s 5th Research Center (Yokosuka), which is responsible for sonar and underwater weapons.  TRDI is a ‘purple’ organization, albeit with Ground, Naval, Air Systems and Guided Missile Development Departments; each component of the JSDF also, we were told, pursues some of its own developments.  Given the restrictions on JDA activities and on technology transfer, plus the close relationships with the United States, there is a very active MDAO program in both FMS and DCS, as well as many DEAs and cooperative R&D programs.  Nonetheless there is a strong seam of Japanese self-reliance and desire to support the indigenous industrial base (mostly the major companies; albeit they basically ‘fence’ their defense activities from their commercial programs) and indeed there are several Japanese developments in which we have significant interest.

University of Hokkaido:  Dr Narita and I visited two professors at the Institute of Low Temperature Research (categorized by MEXT as an “Attached Institute for Joint Use”). This Institute was founded in 1941 by Prof Nakaya, the first person to generate artificial snow crystals.   Prof. Wakatsuchi (currently the Institute Director) and his colleagues study ocean dynamics in northern seas, and recently hosted a conference that focused on the results from three years of research in the Sea of Okhotsk (Lynn Talley of SIO and Steve Riser of UW were NSF supported PI’s in this US-Japan-Russian joint effort).  Prof Hondoh, previous Director, described the overall program of the Institute including its extensive work on permafrost and its changes in Siberia.  There are four main groups studying marine and atmospheric science, the cryosphere, basic low temperature processes, and boreal ecosystems. They have maintained an observatory in Mombetsu for 30 years, both to study sea ice and its impact on structures and ships, and to provide information on ice characteristics (using radar) to fishermen and tourist boats. The ice records show some interesting decadal variations, plus an overall decrease in mean ice coverage. Prof Hondoh also described his own research on ice cores, emphasizing the formation and characteristics of air hydrate chathrates.  His storage (-50C) and analytical facilities are outstanding, as is his science.

C:  Opportunities and Comments

ONR has reason to be proud of its Asia IFO office.  It is extremely well run and managed, and beautifully outfitted.  The decision to station a Military OIC in Tokyo was correct, and Commander Pennypacker has done a superlative job.  He is properly focused on S&T policy issues and upon improving coordination with MDAO and S&T staff at the Embassy, and with the SAO community throughout the AOR.  I do have several comments.

-     ONR should maintain its Asian headquarters in Tokyo.   Communications are excellent. Living and travel are satisfactory if expensive, and most importantly Japan is our closest Asian ally and the source of exceptional technology.  A Japan focus will be particularly important as the reforms take effect and as Japan itself becomes more international; especially noteworthy are its relationships with and access to Russia, China, and Korea, as well as its growing interaction with ASEAN. 

-     The tri-service members at the office are intermingled, and seem to work very well together.  Even more than in London it is foolish and wasteful, as well as frequently counterproductive in relationships with other US staff and with international partners, to maintain three separate administrative structures.

-            Language capability is important.  ONR Asia staff should be selected with this in mind, and when they do not come with language training should at least be sent to the local Berlitz or other language school for six weeks or so of immersion training upon arrival.  There is an inevitable stand-up period for any overseas assignment, and this period would be best utilized in improving the interaction skills of the scientists and administrators.  Return on investment in terms of ability and quality of life should take much less than even the first year of a minimum length tour.

-     Staffing policy need not be the same as for London.  First, the military services are truly integrated (except again for command and administration).  Second, it takes considerably longer to develop ties to researchers and research units in Japan and East Asia than in Europe.  I strongly recommend that rotational assignments be encouraged, since affiliation with local researchers opens many doors in addition to the normal benefits of the program. During this trip I benefited greatly from having had contact with Japanese science for some 40 years, and from being able to renew friendships with my previous colleagues, many of whom are now in senior positions.  Also, extended tours for senior scientists (as opposed to those for whom this would be a growth tour) should be considered.

-     Local resources should be exploited to enhance the office’s reach and depth.  Retired Japanese academics and industrialists could provide invaluable insight and contacts.  I found it easy (with the help of Drs Narita and Blanpied, and Commander Pennypacker) to get a synoptic picture of top level issues.  It is also relatively easy to talk to individual researchers, or to understand individual programs.  However it is very time consuming and difficult to ‘scope’ the bright spots across an institute or university (and there are hundreds worth exploiting that we haven’t hardly touched even after all these years), and access to industry, even the isolated defense sector, without help is extremely difficult. 

-     I believe that it will be very important, particularly over the next few years, to closely follow developments in Japanese S&T policy and structural change.  As I discussed above, this is a crucially important period in Japan’s economic and cultural transformation, and effective S&T collaboration in the future will depend on our ability to understand their strategy, their problems, and the opportunities.  The same goes for their S&T interactions with Asian neighbors, in particular China and Korea.

We can do much to improve our access to Japanese facilities and programs.  Of particular note are the international fellowships offered by JSPS (coordinated by NSF) that go begging for lack of US applicants.  The 7-90 day visit fellowships should be particularly useful for POs and PIs that have interest in particular aspects of Japanese S&T.

In the same vein, but of even greater significance, are the exceptional Japanese facilities for earth science at JAMSTEC (and potentially NASDA).  These include their ships and vehicles, the earth simulator, the deep benthic facilities, their deep sea observatories, the new oceanography institute at Mutsu, and the new drill ship that will have a 4000M riser capability.  I am told that Dr. Norman Neureiter [Science Advisor to the Secretary of State] has already started to discuss increased US-Japanese cooperation in global change S&T with his colleague Dr. Imura, full-time member of the CSTP and former President of the University of Kyoto (and co-chair with Norman of  the US-Japan dialogue Group that developed “An Agenda for Future US-Japan Scientific and Technical Cooperation”, May 2000), in anticipation of a visit to Japan by President Bush[4].  If the US approach to global change is going to emphasize S&T, then enhanced collaboration with Japan, given its historical and continuing focus on the environment, as well as its world class facilities and excellent researchers, would be only logical.  There are similarly many opportunities for enhanced cooperation in cleaner energy systems; and in this instance, Navy shares an interest with other US agencies and with Japan in methane hydrates.  I strongly recommend that ONR discuss with the Office of the S&T Advisor to the Secretary of State, ways that our mutual agendas can be advanced by enhanced US-Japan collaboration in marine S&T.

Addendum:

Japan:  S&T Policy

One of my principal recommendations regarding Japanese S&T is that we closely follow changes in policy and structure for at least the next few years.  This recommendation, based upon my conclusion that revitalization of S&T, as an adjunct to economic reforms and other government changes, is crucial to the nation’s future, was reinforced during a dinner on 3 August, the evening of my departure, after I had completed my preliminary report.  In addition to my wife Cynthia and me and Dr. Narita from ONR, attendees were Toshio Yamagata, Professor at the University of Tokyo and a Director of the Earth Frontier Research Center (noted for his recent discovery of the Indian Ocean Dipole which has a major effect on South and East Asian weather); Kaoru Mamiya, since January 2001 Director-General of the National Institute of Science and Technology Policy (NISTEP), MEXT; and Mr. Yoshiro Miki, Executive of JAMSTEC’s International Relations Department.  I have known Mr. Miki and Mr. Mamiya for several years, notably when Mr. Mamiya was the Director of JAMSTEC’s Planning Department.

First, a couple additional notes about the Council for Science and Technology Policy (CSTP).  It is one of only four such councils.  The others deal with Economic and Fiscal Policy, Central Disaster Management, and Gender Equality.  Thus S&T is clearly one of the top priorities of the Japanese government.  CSTP is chaired by the Prime Minister, has a total of 14 members and is supported by a Cabinet Office, as well as NISTEP. The Minister of  State for Science and the Chief Cabinet Secretary are statutory members; all others are appointed by the PM.  These include the Ministers of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications; Finance; MEXT; and METI.  The eight others are Dr Yoshikawa, President of the Science Council of Japan, and seven “Excellent Learned Persons concerning S&T” from universities and industry, four of whom serve full time.  CSTP’s mandate includes humanities and social sciences as well as natural and engineering sciences.  In addition to setting basic policy, it establishes resource allocation policy and evaluates large, ‘target’ projects and the activities and results of MEXT and the other S&T affiliated Ministries.

CSTP therefore provides basic policy direction to, and overall coordination of, MEXT and the other Ministries with S&T responsibilities.  Within MEXT there is a Council for S&T, again chaired by the PM, with 10 members.  It helps the MEXT Minister in her responsibility to formulate, and coordinate with other ministries, concrete plans and policies founded upon  the basic policy from CSTP.  MEXT also promotes and evaluates R&D in the areas prioritized by CSTP, and implements reforms the S&T system within the S&T execution organizations within its purview (previously those of STA and Monbusho, i.e. the public universities, public R&D corporations, and the newly independent administrative institutions), which account for almost two-thirds of the national S&T budget.

NISTEP is administratively within MEXT.  It has a staff of 54 (38 researchers).  It conducts foresight surveys and studies various aspects of S&T to help policy makers formulate and understand the effects of their policies (e.g., effect of investments, personnel systems, S&T literacy, regional programs), helps design evaluation systems, and coordinates with similar overseas organizations (e.g., OECD, EU’s IPTS).  It provides results and advice to CSTP as well as to its parent Ministry.  Mr. Mamiya was appointed to the position of Director-General of NISTEP in January 2001, i.e. right at the time that the new S&T administrative structure was put in place.

In our discussions and NISTEP literature, Mr. Mamiya emphasized several points:

- “S&T is a vital key to overcoming the various issues Japan is facing today, and to open up new possibilities for Japan in the future…”

- Perceptive policies for promoting S&T are essential if S&T is to contribute, as it must, to the nation’s future.

- A key component of the policy is promotion of excellence.  Thus, for example, the Plan calls for promotion of basic research, and a goal of 30 Nobel laureates in the next 50 years (in this light, Prof Yamagata noted that “all Professors are equal” today, an obvious disincentive to excellence).

- Adequate funds are also required, both for their own sake and as a symbol of the importance of S&T to the nation, and the national commitment to excellence.  Thus setting the goal of 24 trillion Yen over the next five years was central to the new policy, and meeting it will be very important.

- Objective survey and analysis is essential to the formulation of policy.  Thus in addition to its theory and policy oriented research groups,  NISTEP established this January an S&T Foresight Center, which immediately conducted a study of the state and future trends in the key fields in the Second Basic Plan (Life Science, Environment, information technology, and nanoscience and materials; plus energy, manufacturing, infrastructure and Frontiers).  Notably, NISTEP got over 80 percent response on each round of questionnaires.

Basically, to reiterate, my conclusions about Japan’s perceptions of the importance of S&T, and its commitment to both past and future reforms, were reinforced by these discussions with a colleague who will play a very significant role in recommending and evaluating them.  I therefore reemphasize my recommendation that the ONR Asia Office focus much of its attention on S&T policy and strategy, using both available and additional resources.  We not only have much to learn, but if we are astute, we can help Japan with its efforts to improve its contributions to the global S&T base while simultaneously availing ourselves of better access to its facilities and researchers.  As an environmental scientist I am particularly excited by the opportunities for collaboration in earth, atmospheric, space and ocean sciences, particularly given the US S&T-based approach to environmental change; but similar opportunities exist in many other fields of interest to ONR.

[1]For more information on the reforms, the rationale behind them, and the Second S&T Basic Plan, as well as other Japanese S&T items of interest, see the NSF Tokyo Policy reports, which can be found at http://www.twics.com/~nsftokyo/trm.html

[2]As Bill Blanpied, NSF Tokyo notes, The Cabinet Office itself is an innovative creation rather analogous to the Executive Office of the President in the United States.  For the first time, the Japanese Prime Minister has an office with an extensive staff that should permit him to get his arms around the entire government.

[3] See http://www.twics.com/~nsftokyo/home.html

[4] President Bush had been scheduled to visit Japan in October 2001 prior to the APEC Summit in Shanghai, but canceled his anticipated visit after September 11^th.