NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
TOKYO REGIONAL OFFICE
The National Science Foundation's (NSF) Tokyo Regional Office periodically receives and disseminates reports on research developments in Japan that are related to the Foundation's mission. It also provide occasional reports on developments in other East Asian Countries.
These reports present information for the use of NSF program officers and policy makers; they are not statements of NSF policy.
Special Scientific Report #03-02 (May 19, 2003)
The following report was prepared by Dr. William A. Blanpied, Visiting Senior Research Scholar at George Mason University, who served as Director of NSF’s Tokyo Regional Office from July 1999 through August 2002. Dr. Blanpied returned to Japan from March 16 to April 26, 2003, courtesy of a Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) short-term invitational fellowship. The National Institute for Science and Technology Policy (NISTEP) served as his host institution during his fellowship. A good deal of his report is based on interviews he conducted with approximately 40 experts in government, academia and industry during his six week visit to Japan. Dr. Blanpied can be reached at Bblanpied@aol.com.
Introduction
It is only a slight exaggeration to state that prior to 2001, the Government of Japan lacked any effective, coherent science and technology policy, where the emphasis should be on the two modifiers. It is true that prior to January 2001, individual science and technology-related ministries and agencies frequently adopted and implemented their own policies, often in the form of budget initiatives. To the extent such initiatives were approved by the all powerful Ministry of Finance, these qualified as quasi-government policies. On the other hand, Japanese government organizations (particularly before 2001) were notoriously insular so that an initiative by one such organization was rarely, if ever, coordinated with an analogous initiative by another. Likewise these separate ministries and agencies (particularly the Science and Technology Agency of Japan-STA-after it was created within the Prime Minister’s Office in 1959) issued periodic statements (or what in the United States would be called vision statements) concerning desirable directions for Japan’s science policy. But although these visions were often laudable, no means existed to implement them.
The reason why the Japanese Government’s inability to develop and implement an effective, coherent policy even in those years during which, from the perspective of the United States and Europe, the country was well on its way towards establishing world wide commercial dominance based on technology, is not difficult to understand. Basically, the development and implementation of an effective, coherent government science policy (or a policy of any description, for that matter) requires, at a minimum, that the head of government and his or her senior advisers have a mechanism in place to identify a set of priorities appropriate to the economic, social and political conditions of the country, as well the legal and institutional means to require that the policies and programs of all relevant ministries and agencies are consistent with those government-wide priorities. Prior to January 2001, the Prime Minister of Japan had insufficient staff support to provide the detailed knowledge required to formulate a coherent science policy, and lacked any official means to require the relevant government ministries and agencies to carry out that policy[1]. To the extent that the Japanese Government could be said to have any science policy, it was no more than the aggregate of the largely related policies of all its ministries and agencies-- “policy by stapler”, as one Japanese science policy scholar has suggested!
January 2001 Reorganization and Reform
This situation changed considerably on January 6, 2001, when a series of measures enacted by the Diet to reorganize and reform the Japanese government went into effect. Although virtually all ministries and agencies were affected, the impact on the government’s science and technology enterprise and, in particular, on the ability of the prime minister and his cabinet to formulate and implement an effective, coherent science policy were particularly significant. Effective on that date, the Ministry of Education and Science (Monbusho) and the Science and Technology Agency of Japan (STA), which together accounted for approximately two-thirds of all government funds for science and technology, were merged into a single new organization: the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, or MEXT (See NSF Tokyo Report Memorandum #00-08, “A Radical Restructuring of Japan’s Postwar S&T Policy and Institutions, dated May 15, 2000.).
More significantly, a Cabinet Office was created with the objective of providing the prime minister and his cabinet with a sufficient staff to obtain the requisite information required to formulate coherent, effective policies and to manage the various ministries that constitute the Japanese Government. Several new ministers of state were created, including a Minister of State for Science and Technology who, by law, outranks all ministers who head the science and technology-related operating ministries of the government, primarily MEXT and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). Finally, and most important from the perspective of science and technology policy, a National Council for Science and Technology Policy, staffed by a Science and Technology Bureau within the Cabinet Office, was created with the mandate to formulate and implement a coherent government-wide science policy. (See NSF Tokyo Report Memorandum #01-15, “A New System for Promoting Science and Technology in Japan”, dated December 4, 2001.)
The National Council for Science and Technology Policy
The National Council for Science and Technology Policy (CSTP), whose de jura chair is the prime minister and whose de facto chair is the Minister of State for Science and Technology, consists of seven appointed Executive Members (three of them permanent and the remaining four distinguished scientists or engineers appointed for two year terms), the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the ministers who head four relevant ministries[2], and the President of the Science Council of Japan. Abundant evidence, considered in detail below, suggests that the CSTP takes its responsibilities seriously and is becoming an increasingly effective organization. It held 26, hour-long monthly conferences chaired by the prime minister between January 2001 and March 2003 [3]. Many of these conferences were devoted to discussing the status of the principal objectives of the government’s science policy, as set forth in its 2nd Science and Technology Basic Plan, which went into effect on April 1, 2001, the first day of Japanese Fiscal Year (JFY) 2001. Monthly conferences have also considered other significant issues such as: utilization of human embryonic stem cells, bioethics and the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER)…
In order to understand the more substantial decisions and actions taken by the CSTP since January 2001, it is useful to examine the 2nd Science and Technology Basic Plan-not only its substance, but the way it was devised and why. As a prerequisite it is useful to begin with the enactment of the Science and Technology Basic Law by the Diet in November 1995.
The Science and Technology Basic Law
While it is essentially true that prior to January 6, 2001 the Japanese Government lacked an effective, coherent science policy, it could also be reasonably argued that starting in November 1995, the country had a virtual science policy. That virtual policy consisted in the first instance of an assertion by Japan’s Diet that the government should, in fact, formulate and implement an effective, coherent science policy. (See NSF Tokyo Report Memorandum #96-11, “Japan’s Basic Law for Science and Technology,” dated April 3, 1996.)
With few exceptions, measures considered and enacted by Japan’s Diet are drafted by career civil servants within the government’s ministries and agencies. The Science and Technology Basic Law[4] was unique in this respect in that it originated in the Diet itself. The prime mover was Mr. Koji Omi, previously a civil servant with the Ministry of International Trade and Technology (MITI) who, in 2001, would become the first Minister of State for Science and Technology. Omi had become convinced that a drastic change in Japan’s perspective regarding its science and technology enterprise was necessary if the country was to maintain its international, commercial competitiveness. In consultation with leading members of Japan’s scientific establishment, Omi drafted a bill, which was enacted by the Diet in November 1995, requiring the government to develop specific programs to strengthen the country’s science and technology infrastructure and to bring about reforms in that system (particularly its academic sector) so that it could be more effective in addressing the broad needs of the Japanese economy and society.
The First Basic Plan
The government (that is, the prime minister and his cabinet) responded to the Basic Law by establishing a committee with representatives from relevant ministries and agencies. The committee was convened by the Council on Science and Technology[5] and also included representatives from various non-government organizations, including national and private universities and the Science Council of Japan. It charge was to draft a five year plan for consideration by the Cabinet, with action items to strengthen Japan’s publicly-supported science and technology infrastructure. The resultant (1st) Science and Technology Basic Plan was adopted by the government in June 1996 for a period extending to March 31, 2001, the end of Japanese Fiscal Year 2001. (See NSF Tokyo Report Memorandum #96-21, “Japan’s ‘Basic Plan’ for Science and Technology,” dated August 28, 1996.)
Probably the best known provision of the Plan was the government’s commitment to invest 17 trillion yen[6] in the nation’s publicly supported science and technology system over the five years of the plan so that by March 31, 2001, government investments in science and technology would be double what they were during JFY 1992. This provision was intended to provide additional research support particularly to national universities, but also to several national laboratories.
Of more lasting significance, perhaps, were several key provisions intended to bring about long-term improvements in the human and physical infrastructure of the government supported science and technology system. The most important of these were:
Addressing a meeting of the Tokyo Science and Technology Diplomat’s Circle in November 2000, Dr. Hiroo Imura (who was to become an Executive Member of the CSTP in January 2001) noted with considerable satisfaction that the goal of investing 17 trillion yen into the science and technology system had, in fact, been exceeded by 1 percent. As to other key provisions of the Plan: a system of limited-term (normally five-year) appointments had been created, as had 10,000 post-doctoral positions, funded primarily by Monbusho, STA and MITI. On the other hand, although changes in intellectual property provisions and a relaxation of regulations governing activities of national university faculty had been made, in his opinion much more needed to be done to stimulate effective university-industry research cooperation. As to improving university R&D facilities: Imura conceded that these were generally in such bad shape that five years had proved to be insufficient to address these needs.
It is useful to recall that until the final three months of the period of the 1st Plan, the Japanese government lacked any institutional means to coordinate actions of the relevant ministries and agencies with respect to its key provisions. This being the case, the fact that several of these provisions appear to have been addressed more or less successfully suggests a considerable degree of consensus among the relevant ministries and agencies (as well as the Ministry of Finance) regarding their importance.
Formulation of the Second Basic Plan
Near the beginning of JFY 1999, somewhat over half way through the time period of the 1st Science and Technology Basic Plan, serious consultations were initiated with the intention of formulating a 2nd Basic Plan. To this end and as with the formulation of the 1st Basic Plan, a committee was created consisting of representatives from the government’s principal science and technology-related ministries and agencies, as well as representatives from leading non-government science and technology-related organizations. At the time this committee was created it was not at all clear under what authority a 2nd Basic Plan would be adopted as an official policy instrument of the Japanese Government or, indeed, whether the government would even adopt a 2nd Science and Technology Basic Plan at all [7]. However, far-sighted members of the Council for Science and Technology (which served as convener of this committee and was at that time housed in STA), anticipated that with the impending January 2001 government reorganization, that body would be elevated to the status of a National Council for Science and Technology Policy (CSTP) within a newly created Cabinet Office. That, of course, is what happened. On March 27, 2001, at its fourth monthly conference and under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Koizumi, the CSTP officially adopted the fully formulated 2nd Science and Technology Basic Plan, to be effective for a five year period starting on April 1, 2001.
Structure of the 2nd Basic Plan
The 1st and 2nd Basic Plans both set goals for government science and technology investments over their respective five-year time periods. The 1st Plan set a goal of 17 trillion yen, which was actually exceeded by 1 percent. The 2nd Plan set the more ambitious goal of 24 trillion yen which the Ministry of Finance accepted with the provision that progress towards that goal would be tied to annual changes in Japan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
While the overall objective of the 1st Plan was to improve the infrastructure of Japan’s publicly supported science and technology system, the emphasis of the 2nd Plan is to reform that system, particularly its academic sector. Most of the key system reform provisions are contained in Section II entitled, “S&T System Reforms to Create and Utilize the Excellent Results”. [8] At a November 13, 2000, meeting of the Tokyo Science and Technology Diplomat’s Circle Dr. Hiroo Imura, who was to become an Executive Member of the CSTP when it was created on January 6, 2001, provided a preview of the Plan. (See NSF Tokyo Report Memorandum #00-18, “Preview of the Second Science and Technology Basic Plan”, dated December 4, 2000.) On that occasion he suggested that the most important provisions contained in Plan could be subsumed under six objectives, namely:
1. Adopting a strategic approach
to government research investments;
2. Building a competitive
research environment;
3. Enhancing the independence and
mobility of young researchers;
4. Improving the research
evaluation system;
5. Utilizing research outcomes
by promoting cooperation among the academic, industrial and government
research sectors;
6. Enhancing communications with society.
The CSTP and the 2nd Basic Plan
It has already been emphasized that during all but the
final three months of the 1st Science and Technology Basic Plan, the
Japanese Government had no effective mechanism for assuring that its provisions
would be addressed in any coherent manner. In contrast, with the creation of the
CSTP on January 6, 2001, a means existed whereby the government could impose a
measure of discipline on its science and technology-related ministries, and
thereby attempt to address the objectives of the 2nd Science and
Technology Basic Plan coherently and effectively. Indeed, the 2nd
Plan has served to define many, perhaps even most of the CSTP’s deliberations.
Between January 2001 and March 31, 2003, it held 26 monthly conferences chaired by the Prime
Minister[9].
Starting with the 10th monthly conference on September 21, 2001,
one or another of the six principal objectives of the 2nd
Basic Plan have been on the agenda for all but five of these conferences.
Indeed, at its first monthly conference on January 18, 2001, more than two
months prior to the formal adoption of the Plan, the CSTP established five expert panels.
Three of these (S&T Promotion Strategy, Evaluation, and R&D
System Reform) correspond to one of the principal objectives of the Plan; the
remaining expert panels formed at that time were devoted to the topics bioethics
and the status of the Science Council of Japan. Subsequently, two additional expert panels
-on space development and utilization and on management of intellectual properties-have
been established.
Since the CSTP was established in order to function as
“a control tower to promote science and technology” in Japan, then it is
also true that a good deal can be learned about trends in Japanese science
policy since January 2001 by examining actions of the CSTP and the relevant
science and technology-related ministries, particularly MEXT and METI, as well
as the responses of the non-government scientific enterprise to these actions.
It is convenient explore these actions and at least their short term
impacts with reference to the six objectives articulated by Dr. Imura in
November 2000.
Adopting a strategic approach to government research investments
As the principal means for implementing this objective, Chapter 2:2 of the 2nd Plan
identifies four, largely mission-oriented research themes as principal priority
areas for emphasis during its five-year time span, and four themes as secondary
priority areas. The principal priority research areas are: life sciences, information
technologies, environmental science, and materials science. The secondary
priority areas are: energy science, manufacturing technologies, social
infrastructure, and frontier science (such as space science and marine
technology) The Plan then specifies that approximately 50 percent of the
government’s research budget from JFY 2001 through 2005 should be devoted to
supporting research in these priority areas, with the remaining 50 percent to be
used to support research in other areas of science and technology.
Although the CSTP has discussed the strategic approach objective as an explicit agenda item at only
one of its monthly conferences
[10], its staff in the Cabinet Office has obviously dealt with it on many other
occasions in connection with the formulation of the government’s science- and
technology-related budgets for JFY 2002 and 2003. It is worth noting that the
CSTP has more control over how this objective is implemented than it has over any
of the remaining five, since it issues guidelines to the relevant ministries on budget
preparation, and is responsible for preparing the government’s final S&T-related
budget based on submissions by the separate ministries. It is also worth noting that
implementing such a strategic approach to a Japanese government S&T budget would have
been exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, prior to the creation of the Cabinet Office
and the CSTP in January 2001. The very fact that the 2nd Plan identifies priority research areas appears to be having a
decided impact on the ways in which Japanese government organizations are
conceptualizing the budgets themselves. For example, the CSTP’s public documents which describe the
science and technology-related aspects of the JFY 2002 and 2003 budgets are framed primarily
in terms of these priority areas. Indeed, anyone who had never seen a Japanese government budget
document before might have difficulty discerning that research fields in addition to the four
principal (and occasionally the four secondary) priority areas are receiving any
government support at all!
As another indication of the impact of the CSTP’s actions with respect to this objective, the
National Institute of Science and Technology Policy’ (NISTEP’s) Science and Technology Foresight Center
has been organized into sections corresponding to the four primary priority areas of the 2nd
Plan. Additionally, four of the six sections of the Foresight Center’s quarterly Science
and Technology Trends correspond to the four principal priority areas of the Plan. Whether or not
this heavy, indeed almost exclusive emphasis on the priority research areas of the 2nd
Plan should be regarded as reasonable must, of course, be largely a value judgment.
Building a competitive research environment. The CSTP has discussed this objective as an explicit agenda item at three of its monthly conferences,
and on one of those occasions (June 2002) issued a report by one of its expert
panels (See NSF Tokyo Office Report Memorandum #02-06, “Reform of the Japanese System for Competitive Research
Funding: Interim Report,” dated July 26, 2002).
The 2nd Basic Plan aims to double the percentage of government research support allotted
on a competitive basis from nine to 18 percent over its five-year time span. Because this objective
can be addressed largely though not exclusively by means of the government’s annual budgets, the
CSTP has considerable control over its implementation, although perhaps not so much control as it does over
the allocation of funds to specific research areas. For example, the combined budgets of MEXT and the
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) for awarding competitive Grants-in Aid for Research
(Kakenhi grants) have been increased substantially during the past two years, with the possibility
that those budgets will have been doubled by the final year of the 2nd Plan.
If this outcome actually occurs, the goal of doubling the percentage of funds awarded competitively would
be realized provided, of course, that funds available on a non-competitive basis were to remain
constant! Of course this is unlikely, although it may well be that non-competitive funding will increase at
a less rapid rate than competitive funds.
Relevant ministries, particularly MEXT, have also introduced programs to further the goal of building
a competitive research environment. For example, in 2002, MEXT announced a new Center of Excellence (COE)
Program (often referred to as the Toyama Plan, after MEXT Minister Atsuko Toyama) to provide
special grants in five areas on a competitive basis to from 10 to 30
universities during JFY 2002 and an equivalent number of grants in another five
areas in JFY 2003. A total of 18.2 billion yen was allocated for this COE program for JFY 2002 (See
NSF Tokyo Report Memorandum #02-05, “Toyama Plan: Center of Excellence Program for the 21st Century,”
dated June 21, 2002.) A total of 225 proposals were submitted for the second, JFY 2003 COE
competition by the March 2003 closing date, with results expected to be announced in June.
Another, non-budgetary initiative taken by the CSTP has been to require all S&T-related ministries
(as well as quasi government organizations such as JSPS) to institute so-called
program officer systems sometime during JFY 2003. MEXT introduced a system of 25
part time program officers from universities effective on April 1, and JSPS will
introduce such a system in October. It is not entirely clear
how newly designated program officers are expected to function, or exactly why
the system was instituted in the first place. Several of JSPS’s counterpart agencies in
other countries, including National Science Foundation, instituted program officer systems at an early
stage in their history. However, NSF and many of its counterparts are organized according to
disciplinary programs, whereas neither MEXT nor JSPS are organized in this way.
So an obvious question is: what are the programs for which the new program officers will
be responsible? As to why the system was created, there is a vague though widespread
impression that the competitiveness of the relevant ministries will be improved
if working scientists are inserted into the system to monitor their operations.
In any event, the program officer system is intriguing and will be well
worth monitoring to try to determine its impacts after three to five years.
No doubt the intent of the 2nd Plan with respect to the competitiveness objective was to
increase the competitiveness of the overall publicly supported Japanese research
system. However, many observers point out that the programs initiated by the relevant
ministries to address this objective do so in a highly limited way. The
large, indeed one might even say the overwhelming majority of these initiatives
apply to universities, including both national and private universities. On the other hand,
a substantial proportion of the Japanese government’s research budget is allocated on a non-competitive
basis to national laboratories, such as the National Institute for Advanced Industrial
Science and Technology (AIST) laboratories in Tsukuba and throughout the
country, and to institutions such as RIKEN and JAMSTEC which are currently
classified as public corporations but are due to become independent
administrative agencies in October 2003.
Additionally, although it is true that MEXT’s and JSPS budgets for competitive
Kakenhi grants have continued to increase substantially, it is also true that the size
of these grants-in-aid are quite small. Several observers are skeptical about whether larger
grants available to universities, such as the Japan Science and Technology Cooperation’s (JST’s)
ERATO and CREST awards are (or ever will be) made on a genuinely competitive basis.
On the other hand, it may well be that important elements of the Japanese government-supported
research system will soon be competing against one another, perhaps in not an
entirely healthy way. In particular, there is a widespread consensus that there are
probably too many national universities in Japan, particularly in view of
the declining number of 18 year olds in the country. Thus, when the 99 national
universities become independent administrative agencies on April 1, 2004, strong
competition among them to determine which will survive over the next decade or so is
likely to emerge. Although some degree of competition among universities is no doubt
desirable, one can only hope that if (as seems probable) the number of national universities
must decrease, that the mode in which the contraction of the system is accomplished will be both
rational and fair.
Enhancing the independence and mobility of young researchers This particular objective has not appeared as an explicit agenda item for any of the CSTP’s
monthly conferences, although conceivably it could have been discussed at one of
two conferences devoted, in part, to the broader topic of system reform.
Successful implementation of this objective will require significant and in some
cases even radical structural change in the research institutions where younger
scientists work. For this reason, the CSTP probably has less control on how to
implement this objective effectively than is the case for any of the other five
listed earlier. Yet there is a widespread and emphatic consensus that the future
vitality of Japan’s science and technology system is vitally dependent on providing
a substantially greater degree of independence for young researchers, as well as
encouraging their intersectoral and international mobility.
Two related key objectives of the 1st Basic Plan were: (1) to increase the number of
post-doctoral positions in Japan to 10,000 by 2001, and
(2) to increase the number of advantageous term (i.e., five-year) research
appointments available to young researchers. Both objectives were accomplished, although a
large number of the newly-created post-doctoral positions were awarded to non-Japanese nationals
-in large measure because the number of PhDs in science and engineering awarded in
Japan, per capita, is small compared with comparable per capita ratios in the United States and
Europe. No doubt several factors account for the relatively small number of
Japanese PhDs in science. Certainly one important factor must be that, unlike the situation
in the United States or most major European countries, financial aid is rarely available to
Japanese students who wish to pursue studies in science and engineering beyond the
baccalaureate level. Therefore, those who aspire to earn a PhDs in science or engineering must
pay all of their costs and/or rely on their families for assistance.
What has (or is to) become of those promising young scientists and engineers who have been awarded
one of the recently created prestigious five-year appointments that provides
them with a considerable degree of independence in their research? That is, what happens to
them after they complete those five-year appointments? Most private Japanese
companies would prefer not to hire PhDs, not to mention individuals who have
completed five years of independent research, although perhaps this situation
may be changing. Some of these young scientists who are conducting research
in national laboratories (such as the AIST laboratories or in RIKEN or JAMSTEC
facilities), for example, may succeed in obtaining longer-term positions in
those laboratories, even though the appointments of researchers at RIKEN and
JAMSTEC (in common with appointments of faculty at national universities after
April 1, 2004) are on a limited term, contract basis. However, the number of positions
available to younger researchers in national and quasi national laboratories will necessarily
be limited.
Those who aspire to
careers in universities face a different, possibly more difficult dilemma. For although
the tenure system in national universities is due to be altered considerably starting in
April 2004, it will probably still be the case that the koza system will continue
to survive in some form for the foreseeable future. Thus, talented young scientists who
have worked largely independently five years under the terms of prestigious, five-year
appointments and who aspire to careers in universities will still be compelled to spend a
large portion of their careers working under the guidance of senior professors, rather than
being able to continue their independent research careers.
Addressing this
particular objective successfully, as already suggested, will probably turn out
to be more difficult than is the case for any other objective of the 2nd
Basic Plan, a point on which virtually all knowledgeable observers agree. At least a
few Japanese government officials with broad responsibility
for the science and technology system are convinced that the issue of expanded
independence and opportunities for young researchers will be squarely and
explicitly addressed in the 3rd Science and Technology Basic Plan
(2006-2011).
Improving the research evaluation system
This objective has appeared as a specific agenda item for
no less than six CSTP monthly conferences, twice as many times as any of the
other six objectives noted earlier. Two of these conferences coincided with the
release of reports on research evaluation by expert panels: in November 2001
and December 2002, respectively. Some of these conferences appear to have considered
issues associated with evaluations of the (former) government research organizations;
others were concerned with the CSTP’s own activity in evaluating several large-scale
science projects, as well as the AIST system of institutes and centers created
in April 2001. The CSTP has also been quite open in its evaluation of projects submitted
by the relevant ministries as proposed budget items for JFY 2002 and 2003 (see NSF Tokyo
Report Memorandum #02-10, “Requested Projects Rank Ordered by CSTP,” dated February 18, 2002).
Evidently the CSTP attaches considerable importance to improving the research evaluation system.
This reflects the widespread expectation that the outcomes of the evaluations of research organizations
(and possibly individual researchers) will be important in determining the ways in which the Japanese
science and technology system evolves in the medium to long term future.
In addition to being one of the principal objectives of the 2nd Basic Plan, research
evaluation also appears prominently in documents associated with the April 2001
transition of government laboratories to the status of independent
administrative agencies. For example, METI is already allocating from 10 to 15 percent
of the research budgets of the institutes and centers that now comprise the AIST system
on the basis of annual evaluations, and individual researchers whose research is
evaluated as excellent are receiving bonuses. It is also anticipated that in the future
(say five to six years after they become independent administrative agencies) the research
budgets of the national universities will also be partially determined by the outcomes of
research evaluation.
During the two years since Japanese government laboratories became independent administrative
agencies, AIST has conducted three evaluations of its 54 separate research units
and the individual researchers within those units: the first in April 2001 to
set a baseline, and the other two at the end JFY 2001 and 2002, respectively.
Additionally, METI itself as well as the CSTP have both conducted their
own evaluations of the AIST system. To use an American idiom, this may well have
been overkill, since individual researchers were obliged to spend a considerable amount
of time preparing for these evaluations. In addition, annual evaluations could have the
effect of forcing researchers to adopt short-term perspectives towards their research.
On a more positive note, knowledgeable observers believe that these research evaluations have been
an important factor in altering the outlook of AIST researchers. Prior to 2001 many, perhaps
even a majority, paid too little attention to the fact that the research they were supposed to
conduct was intended to be relevant to industry and society. Now that these researchers are
obliged to think about having their work evaluated, many appear to be paying more attention to
the roles they should play as AIST researchers.
Turning from evaluation of the AIST system to the imminent research evaluation of national
universities, there appears to be a great deal of uncertainty as well as a measure of anxiety
about the CSTP’s (and MEXT’s) intentions in this respect. There is some concern that research
activities of individual university faculty members will be assessed exclusively in terms
of standard numerical indicators such as the number of papers published in referred journals,
citations to those paper, patents granted, etc. There is also concern that if such purely
quantitative indicators are used to evaluate research performance, the ultimate result might be to
discourage university faculty from conducting quality basic research with the
objective of seeking new knowledge for its own sake, and pushing them more
towards conducting research they believe will be of some commercial value.
There is probably no way of knowing how widespread these concerns are
among university faculty. On the other hand, one would hope that when the CSTP
and MEXT officials develop detailed plans to evaluate the national universities in
terms of the quality of their research, that they will be mindful of the lessons that AIST
(and METI) have learned about research evaluation since April 2001.
Utilizing research outcomes by promoting cooperation among the academic, industrial and government
research sectors
This objective has been discussed at three of CSTP’s
monthly conferences, with a report by an expert panel issued at its June 2002
conference. Beyond these CSTP discussions, it is probably true that this
particular objective has received more public attention than any objective of
the 2nd Basic Plan. By way of background, it is worth noting that one of the
key provisions of the 1st Science and Technology Basic Plan was to
institute “measures to facilitate university-industry research cooperation,
including changes to intellectual property provisions and a relaxation of
regulations governing the external activities of national university faculty.”
Two such measures were enacted into law by the Diet during the five-year
period of the 1st Basic Plan. The first of these laws, enacted in 1998,
authorized universities and other publicly supported research organizations (such as
AIST and RIKEN) to establish Technology Licensing Organizations (TLOs). The
second, enacted in 2000, assigns intellectual property rights to the university
professor who makes a relevant, patentable discovery, regardless of whether his
or her research is financed by the university’s own funds or by means of a
government grant. This law is frequently called the Japanese Bayh-Dole Act. The objective of utilizing research outcomes more effectively needs to be understood in a broad
sense to include not only: (1) research involving direct collaboration between
university and company scientists (or government and company scientists), but
also activities such as (2) the establishment of TLOs with the objective of
assisting university faculty to patent and then license their discoveries, and
(3) the creation of high tech start up or venture companies from research
conducted either in universities or in government laboratories. Research outcome
utilization needs to be understood in terms of any and all modes of technology
transfer or, better, knowledge transfer from academic organizations to commercial
enterprises, whether they are large, established
companies, or new small or medium sized firms.
In addition to two national summit meetings and several
regional meetings convened by CSTP on the research utilization issue,
[11]
relevant ministries have also created programs to stimulate research
collaborations, particularly between academia and industry. For
example, METI is providing support to university-centered TLOs and has also
initiated an Industrial Cluster Program to facilitate interactions among
universities, companies, and prefectural research organizations. MEXT has initiated a
somewhat analogous Intellectual Cluster Program. MEXT is also providing support to
create special organizations within universities, such as the Handai Frontier Research Center
within the Osaka University School of Engineering which claims that it can act rapidly and avoid
bureaucratic constraints to support specific research projects between university and industry
researchers, as well as to help facilitate the formation
of venture companies spun off from such research.
A considerable amount of activity related broadly to technology (or knowledge) transfer
is going on throughout Japan. Some of it is being funded by MEXT or METI; a good deal is
also being supported by prefectural governments and by large companies. Although
some activity in the knowledge transfer area has been going on for several years
(in a few cases for many years), most observers agree that the intensity of such
activity has definitely increased since the adoption of the 1st and,
particularly, the 2nd Basic Plan and, of course, the two above-noted enabling
acts passed by the Diet. In the opinion of several expert observers, at least some
of this activity is likely to be effective in addressing the broad goal of creating new
types of industries and revitalizing older ones. It also seems likely that the character
of much of the knowledge transfer activity will change somewhat-probably
in an overall positive sense-when the national universities become independent administrative agencies.
Meanwhile, a few caveats may be in order. A good deal, perhaps most of the knowledge-transfer
related activity currently going in Japan is of relatively recent origin. As already noted, the
Diet passed the law permitting the creation of TLOs only in 1998. So the most venerable
TLOs are barely five years old, and several are no more than two or three years
old. For this reason, it can be argued with considerable justice that all Japanese
TLOs are on a steep learning curve. From experience with TLOs in the United States, few if
any become profitable for 10 years, if even then. Thus, the decision of METI to provide
support to the TLOs for only five years should certainly be reconsidered. Also, it is worth
noting that many, perhaps a majority of TLOs in the United States never make a profit.
Still they are considered important as a means for transferring the results of
university research to industry. There are now 27 or 28 TLOs in Japan.
This may too many. If so, in the coming years, universities and their associated
TLOs will need to be flexible and, perhaps, consider merging with other TLOs in their regions.
Finally, it is worth reiterating an obvious if painful fact: in the United States (and in
Germany and the UK, for example), many start up or high tech venture companies
fail after only a few years. Such companies, the venture funds that support them,
as well as relevant government ministries, should be prepared to draw appropriate
lessons from such failures so that, perhaps, the intensity of such failures can decrease
somewhat in the future.
Enhancing communications with society At the above-noted November 13, 2000, meeting of the Tokyo Science and Technology Diplomats Circle,
Dr. Imura
[12] provided a preview of the 2nd Basic Plan, which was, of course,
destined to go into effect on April 1 of the following year (see NSF Tokyo
Report Memorandum #00-18, “Preview of the Second S&T Basic Plan”, dated
December 4, 2000). On that occasion he remarked that the Plan’s objective of
enhancing communications with society certainly encompassed activities designed to
increase public understanding of science. More importantly, he believed that the
entire Japanese science and technology system, particularly its government sector,
needed to become more transparent to the Japanese public.
This objective does not appear to have been discussed as an explicit agenda item
at any of the CSTP’s monthly conferences. On the other hand, the fact that the agenda
for all such conferences are made public (not only in Japanese but in English) and that
periodic reports on important issues considered by the CSTP are also made public,
certainly indicates that the CSTP takes seriously what it perceives as its responsibility
to see that its deliberations are made transparent to the Japanese public. As an additional
example, the CSTP has been quite forthcoming in detailed aspects of budget preparation.
(See, e.g. Tokyo Report Memorandum #02-10, “Requested Projects Rank Ordered by the
CSTP”, dated February 18, 2002.)
A good deal of the quantitative information that will be required to provide a reliable,
quantitatively-based assessment of the impacts of the 2nd Science and
Technology Basic Plan will have to be gathered from relevant ministries,
particularly MEXT (as well as JSPS and JST) and METI. The extent to which these ministries
are forthcoming in providing such data will provide a useful indicator of the relative transparency
of the government’s science system.
Adequacy of the 2nd Basic Plan?
The matter of the adequacy of the 2nd Science and Technology Basic Plan can be viewed
from several perspectives, including: Considering these three points in reverse order: in view
of the complexity of the third, it is unlikely that a foreign observer could
make any reasonable contribution on the question of the extent to which the 2nd
Science and Technology Basic Plan serves the broad needs of Japanese society. As to whether implementation of the Plan’s objectives is
currently having the desired impact on the Japanese science and technology
system: as the body of the report attempts to demonstrate, implementation of
several of these objectives appears to be having a decided impact at least on
parts of the system-most notably, the academic sector. However, there is little
evidence that the objective of increasing the independence and
mobility of young researchers has been the subject of any extensive public
discussion. Nor do there appear to be any new initiatives by MEXT or any other
ministry that aim to address this issue squarely. Most knowledgeable observers,
including at least one high level MEXT official, stated emphatically that the problem
of reforming the public science and technology system so that more young researchers
will enjoy a greater degree of independence and mobility should be one of the highest
priority objectives of the 3rd Science and Technology Basic Plan. Finally as to the narrower but perhaps most pertinent
question as to whether the stated objectives of the Plan are adequate to the
perceived current needs of the Japanese science and technology system: with one
or two exceptions it appears that they are. One of these exceptions, albeit a
partial exception, has to do with the point already made about lack of apparent
action to address the problem of providing young researchers with a greater degree
of independence and mobility. Perhaps the 2nd Science and Technology
Basic Plan should have set forth this objective in such a way that possibilities
for implementation would have suggested themselves. The 3rd Plan should
make every effort to do just that. The full text of the 2nd Science and Technology Basic Plan includes a section
on support and encouragement of science and technology activities at the regional and
prefectural levels. However, this matter does not appear to have been addressed at the
highest levels of the Japanese government-i.e., at the CSTP's monthly
conferences with the Prime Minister. It may well be that the CSTP has considered this
significant matter in the context of facilitating knowledge transfer between the academic
and industrial sectors. Indeed, many if not most regional and prefectural activities are closely
related to the knowledge-transfer objective of the Plan. In any event, it seems clear that
establishing stronger links among the academic, industrial and government sectors can be
pursued most effectively at the regional and prefectural levels, and that successful pursuit
at these levels is likely to have a more immediate and visible impact on regional economies than
on the national economy.
Both MEXT and METI have programs to help facilitate such regional initiatives
[13].
There is also a good deal going on which is not being supported by any
ministry of the central government. A great deal of what is going on deserves to be
explicitly recognized and encouraged by the central government and, in particular, by the CSTP.
Indeed, increasing science and technology promotion at these levels might
well be a much higher priority objective of the 3rd Basic Plan
Related Issues for Further Exploration: (1) National Laboratories as Independent
Administrative Agencies This report has considered some of the impacts on Japan’s public science and
technology system of two significant events that occurred in 2001: (1) the
creation of the National Council for Science and Technology Policy within the
Cabinet Office on January 6, and (2) the adoption of the 2nd Science
and Technology Basic Plan on April 1.
A separate but clearly related event also occurred on April 1 when the status of all government
research facilities, or national laboratories, was changed to that of
independent administrative agencies. What this meant in practice and in detail depends a
good deal on which ministry a specific facility reported to. But in general, this action was
intended to provide the national laboratories with a considerably greater degree of autonomy
(e.g., to hire staff and set research directions) than they had previously enjoyed.
Possibly the most sweeping change resulting from this action had to do with the (former) Agency
for Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), which had been an integral
component of the Ministry of International Trade and Technology (MITI). Prior to April 1, 2001, AIST
operated 15 research facilities-eight in Tsukuba, seven scattered around the country.
Effective on that date, the AIST system was renamed the National
Institute for Advanced Science and Technology (AIST), an organization supported
by, but allegedly independent of the newly reconstituted Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry (METI). As to the 15 AIST laboratories, they were reorganized into
approximately 25 research centers, and an approximately equal number of research institutes.
(See Tokyo Report Memorandum #01-04, “National Institute for Advanced
Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), an Independent Administrative
Organization under the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)”, dated March 28, 2001
.) The AIST research centers have finite lifetimes ranging from three to seven years
and focus on specific, short-term problems. In contrast, the lifetimes of the institutes are
indefinite, and they are meant to concentrate on basic research of interest to industry.
Additionally, there is provision for short term pilot projects to
determine the feasibility of a particular topic for a new center
[14].
METI remains the parent agency for the AIST complex and provides it with
baseline research support, with the provision that the annual research budgets
of the individual units are to be determined, in part, by the results of
periodic evaluations.
There is considerable difference of opinion about how independent AIST really is from METI.
However, there seems to be a broad consensus that the conversion of the
AIST system to an independent administrative agency and its reorganization into
centers and institutes has been beneficial. For example, it is now possible for
company-based researchers to work within the AIST centers and institutes, which was
not possible prior to April 1, 2001. Also, there is now a considerably greater degree
of cooperation with industry. Finally, AIST now has authority to undertake new types
of initiatives without first obtaining permission from METI. For example,
AIST has established its own TLO and is also providing support to several
venture businesses which were created by AIST researchers but are still being
incubated within the institute.
A more detailed, quantitatively-based study of the impacts, after more than two years, of the
April 1, 2001, conversion and reorganization of AIST would appear to be eminently worthwhile.
Related Issues for Further Exploration: (2) National Universities as Independent Administrative Agencies
Although the goals, principles, and other provisions of
the 2nd Science and Technology Plan are applicable to all elements of
the Japanese science and technology system, including national laboratories and
private industry, many indeed most probably all provisions of the Plan are
having the greatest impact on Japanese universities, particularly national
universities. Indeed, it may well be true that the primary rationale for both the 1st
and particularly the 2nd Basic Plan has been to integrate Japanese universities more
closely into the overall Japanese science and technology system. For example:
Although many provisions of the 2nd Basic Plan
present difficult challenges to Japanese universities, particularly the national
universities, they also present opportunities for them to become more
competitive, and to strengthen their links with other research sectors and with
Japanese society more broadly. These opportunities are almost certain to increase
with the conversion of national universities to independent administrative agencies on
April 1, 2004. A bill introduced into the Diet in February
2003 would, among other things, greatly strengthen the management authority of
the presidents of national universities so that they and their external advisory
committees can determine the directions their respective institutions should
pursue. As in the case of the United States and several countries in Western Europe,
Japanese universities will then be in a position to engage in productive competition with one another. The concept of providing Japan’s national universities with a considerable degree of
autonomy appears on balance to be positive. However, “the devil is in the details”.
There is considerable uncertainty about specific provisions that will be
applicable to the national universities and their faculties after April 1, 2004.
For example: Beyond these specific concerns, considerable skepticism
remains about the degree of autonomy that MEXT is really prepared to grant to
the national universities after April 1, 2004. For example, all national universities
are required to submit six-year plans to MEXT, leading some to believe that the ministry
intends to use these plans to keep a large measure of control over the universities.
On the same note, in her February 10, 2003, remarks to a
meeting attended by the presidents of all national universities and
inter-university research institutes, MEXT Minister Atsuko Toyama stated
[unofficial translation] that after April 1, 2004: . . the relation and the balance
of responsibility between the national universities and the government will
necessarily change drastically.
On the other hand, it is needless
to say that the universities’ becoming independent organizations does not mean
privatization of universities. Rather,
taking the opportunity of the shift, both national universities and the
government should map out a plan on how they can share the responsibilities or
collaborate with each other, which is the ultimate goal of the final report
produced by the Investigation Committee [on the specifics of the bill introduced
into the Diet]. Minister
Toyama also took the occasion to remind her audience that: The national universities have so
far tended to be closed or isolated from society in the name of autonomy. In contrast,
the national universities in the future will be required to
introduce the society's wisdom into the school management, listen to the
students and local community people, and make the research/education results and
management status at the universities open to the public, while maintaining
their autonomy.
Taken together, implementation of the principal objectives
of the 2nd Basic Plan with respect to universities, together with the
forthcoming transition of the national universities to a more autonomous status,
have the potential to increase the vitality not only of the universities, but
also of the Japanese science and technology system more broadly. The changes that the
universities are already beginning to undergo will in some cases border on being radical.
It is to be anticipated that mistakes will be made. However, the importance
-one might say the growing importance-of universities to the Japanese science and
technology system requires that various issues and uncertainties associated with their
coming transition should be closely monitored, at least for the first five to 10 years
of the transition. Acknowledgments I am deeply appreciative of the opportunity provided to me
by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) to permit me to travel
to Japan for six weeks and to carry out the investigations whose results are
outline in this report by means of a short-term invitational fellowship.
The National Institute for Science and Technology Policy (NISTEP)
served as my host institution during my six weeks in Japan. I am grateful
to Mr. Tsutomu Imamura, NISTEP’s Director-General, and to Mr. Naoki Saito of
the Planning Division, who were instrumental in encouraging me to apply for the
JSPS fellowship. I am particularly grateful to NISTEP’s Second Theory-Oriented
Research Group-particularly Dr. Hiroyuki Tomizawa, Dr. Hirotsugu Kawasaki,
and Ms. Kazuko Shimizu-providing me with a place to sit, a computer, language
assistance, and highly enjoyable company.
Finally, I wish to acknowledge the approximately 40
experts in government, academia and industry who took the time to provide me
with their frank opinions about various aspects of the 2nd Science
and Technology Basic Plan. Much of this report is based on what I learned in
those discussions. But, obviously, any errors that almost certainly have crept into this
report are entirely my own responsibility, and not of any of those individuals
with whom I met.
[1].
Prior to the second administration of Franklin Roosevelt, the US Government
also lacked any means for developing and implementing Government-wide
policies. But in 1939 year the Executive Office of the President (EoP)
was created with the expressed purpose of providing then President Roosevelt,
and his successors as Presidents of the United States, with the tools required
to understand what was occurring in all cabinet departments, as well as to develop
and implement policies that cut across all those departments. The recently created Japanese Government’s Cabinet Office can be
regarded as being roughly equivalent to the EoP in the United States.
[2].
These ministries are MEXT, METI, the Ministry of Public Management, Home
Affairs, Post and Telecommunications, and the Ministry of Finance.
[3].
Two conferences were held in March 2001-March
22 and March 27, respectively, while no conference was held in July 2002.
[4].
[5]. The Council on Science and Technology, ostensibly chaired by the Prime Minister, was established in 1959 to respond to his requests for advice and assistance on critical science and technology policy issues. However, because the Council was located physically within the headquarters of the Science and Technology Agency of Japan (STA) and relied on STA for staff support, it usually confined its attention to issues pertinent to that agency.
[6]. Although the yen to dollar exchange rate varied over the five years of the 1st Plan, 17 trillion yen would have been approximately equivalent to $120 to $130 billion.
[7]. The November 1995 Science and Technology Basic Law required the government to develop a plan to address the concerns itemized by that law. However, it did not specify how many plans the government should devise, nor the period of time during which they should be effective.
[8]. An unofficial English language translation of the 2nd Science and Technology Basic Plan can be accessed at: http://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/english/s&tmain-e.html.
[9]. Two conferences were held in March 2001-March 22 and March 27, respectively-while no conference was held in July 2002.
[10]. Discussions of actions of the CSTP and other Japanese government organization in this section and those which follow extend only through the end of JFY 2002-i.e., March 31, 2003.
[11]. See NSF Tokyo Report Memorandum #02-03 dated January 1, 2002, and Tokyo Report Memorandum #03-03 dated March 14, 2003.
[12]. At that time Dr. Imura was an Executive Member of the Council on Science and Technology, housed in STA; on January 6, 2001, he was named as an Executive Member of the newly created National Council on Science and Technology Policy.
[13]. For example, the Intellectual Cluster Program in the case of MEXT and the Industrial Cluster Program in the case of METI.
[14]. As of March 31, 2003, AIST consisted of 54 separate research units: approximately 25 centers and an equal number of institutes, and a handful of pilot initiatives.